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Political Corruption and Mergers and Acquisitions 
Abstract 
This research examines the relation between political corruption and mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). We find that local corruption increases firm acquisitiveness but decreases firm 
targetiveness. The levels of corruption in acquirer areas relate positively to the bid premiums and 
negatively to the likelihood of deal completion. Corruption motivates acquiring firms to use excess 
cash for payment, which mitigates the negative effect of corruption on acquirer shareholder value. 
The evidence indicates that acquisitions help acquiring firms convert cash into hard-to-extract 
assets and relocate assets from the high to low corruption areas, thereby shielding their liquid assets 
from expropriation by local officials. 
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“Corruption is a cancer: a cancer that eats away at a citizen's faith in democracy, 
diminishes the instinct for innovation and creativity; already-tight national budgets, 
crowding out important national investments. It wastes the talent of entire generations. It 
scares away investments and jobs.” – Joe Biden 
 
I. Introduction 
  Political corruption is prevalent in the U.S. despite the country being a leading economic 
power. The total number of public corruption convictions in the U.S. has grown significantly, from 
244 cases per year in 1976 to over 1,000 cases per year in the past two decades.1 The increasing 
pervasiveness and deteriorating nature of U.S. political corruption prove to be harmful for business 
operations and the society. Rent seeking due to corruption increases transaction costs, uncertainty, 
inefficient investments, and misallocation of resources (Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), 
Rose-Ackerman (1978)). Corruption also lowers tax revenues, increases public expenditures and 
debt, heightens financial risks, and weakens productivity, competitiveness, and economic growth 
(Kauffman (2010)).  
Political corruption has important implications for corporate policies, such as firm 
liquidity, capital structure, and capital expenditures (Campos, Lien, and Pradhan (1999), Fisman 
and Svensson (2007), Malesky and Samphantharak (2008), Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012), Caprio, 
Faccio, and McConnell (2013), Dass, Nanda and Xiao (2016), and Smith (2016)). However, no 
                                                            
1 Authors’ own calculation based on the yearly number of corruption convictions of each of the 94 federal judicial 
districts in the U.S., which is obtained from the Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public 
Integrity Section. 
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prior research has considered the effects of corruption on mergers and acquisitions (M&As), an 
important form of corporate investment. In this study, we ask whether and how political corruption 
affects M&As. In particular, we investigate the effects of U.S. political corruption on the key 
aspects of M&As including firm acquisitiveness, targetiveness, bid premiums, the likelihood of 
deal completion, payment consideration, and acquirer and target shareholder value. 
McChesney (1987) points out that public officials can employ targeted taxation and threats 
of regulation to extort firms. Extortion is carried out, at both the local and federal levels, via 
multiple methods such as introducing “milker” bills, which are regulations with narrow focus and 
typically expire every few years so that they are used as leverage to ask businesses for donation to 
politicians’ election campaigns or extract other personal benefits. In a similar fashion, tax 
extenders – once used to provide tax breaks and incentives to certain industries for economic 
growth – are now gaining popularity among politicians as common fund raising tool (Schweiser 
(2013)).  
Shleifer and Vishnyi (1993) and Smith (2016) argue that firms may view bribes as a tax 
they want to avoid paying. Faced with local corruption, firms may choose to reduce corporate 
liquidity while increasing debt financing and shortening debt maturity, pursue more opaque 
disclosure policies to shield themselves from local officials’ expropriation, or channel liquid assets 
to hard-to-extract investments (Myers and Rajan (1998), Stulz (2005), Durnev and Fauver (2011), 
Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012), Caprio et al. (2013), Smith (2016)).  
In the M&A context, to the extent that shielding liquid assets from local officials’ 
expropriation serves the shareholders’ interest, we expect firms located in more corrupt areas to 
be more likely to engage in the acquisition of target firms located in less corrupt areas for at least 
two possible reasons. First, acquisitions can help the acquiring firms to convert their liquid assets 
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into hard ones, which are more difficult to extract. Second, acquisitions can facilitate the relocation 
of the acquirers’ assets from more corrupt to less corrupt areas, which further shields their assets 
from local officials’ extraction. Also consistent with the assets shielding argument, firms located 
in more corrupt areas are less likely to be acquisition targets due to a greater threat of expropriation 
to the acquiring firms.  
We begin our analysis by examining the relation between the level of local corruption and 
firm acquisitiveness and targetiveness. We use the corruption per capita measure as a proxy for 
corruption (Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009), Smith (2016)). This measure is calculated as the 
yearly number of corruption convictions of each of the 94 federal judicial districts in the U.S., 
which is obtained from the Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public 
Integrity Section, scaled by the respective district population. We then match the judicial districts’ 
corruption data with the Compustat data and the M&A subsample based on firm headquarters 
location. We use the headquarters location as the identifier since it is where the majority of plants 
and operations of a firm is presumably based (Bai, Fairhurst, and Serfling (2017)).2  
Using a sample that includes 77,338 firm-year observations of 8,314 unique firms spanning 
from 1986 to 2014, we find that the levels of local corruption are positively related to firm 
acquisitiveness but negatively related to firm targetiveness. Since local corruption and corporate 
investments, including M&As, might be correlated with local economic conditions, we control for 
state Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth and GDP per capita in our analysis but our findings 
are insensitive to these controls. To alleviate a concern that corruption is correlated with time-
invariant factors specific to their location, we control for state or judicial district fixed effects in 
                                                            
2 However, we relax this assumption by considering the degree of firm operation concentration around the 
headquarters location in the robustness check section. 
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our analysis but our results are qualitatively unchanged. To address a possibility that both local 
corruption and M&As are correlated with other unobservable factors, a cause of endogeneity bias, 
we further use the instrumental variable (IV) model for estimation but our results continue to hold.  
Using the number of corruption convictions in a judicial district as a proxy for local 
corruption is subject to a possible criticism that a more corrupt district may have a smaller number 
of convictions. To dispel this concern, we use two other measures of political corruption to verify 
our results. The first measure is the outcome of the 2012 State Integrity Investigation conducted 
by the Center of Public Integrity to grade each state’s transparency, accountability, and the law 
systems to deter corruption. The second measure is corruption scores based on the results of a 
survey of State House reporters conducted by Boylan and Long (2003). We find that our results 
for firm acquisitiveness and targetiveness persist. We further employ the recent adoption of the 
anti-corruption laws by Texas and Florida as a plausibly exogenous shock to political corruption 
to identify the relation between corruption and M&As but our findings are essentially unchanged. 
Overall, our findings are consistent with the shielding argument.  
Next, we investigate the relation between corruption and the method of payment in M&As. 
To the extent that corruption motivates firms to shield their liquid assets by managing liquidity 
downward but financial leverage upward (Smith (2016)), acquiring firms located in highly corrupt 
areas are more likely to use stock for acquisition payment due to their low corporate liquidity and 
high debt ratios. This shielding argument further implies that acquiring firms will be more likely 
to use cash for payment if they have excess cash. Consistent with our expectation, we find a 
negative (positive) relation between the corruption levels in the acquirer areas and the likelihood 
of all-cash (stock) payment. Moreover, corruption is positively related to the likelihood of all-cash 
payment conditional on acquiring firms’ excess cash.  
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While firms from highly corrupt areas may choose to pursue acquisitions to shield their 
liquid assets from local officials’ expropriation, target shareholders would be concerned about the 
corruption practice in the acquirers’ areas and view their bids unfavorably. We find that that the 
level of corruption in an acquiring firm’s area relates positively to the bid premium and negatively 
to the likelihood of the deal completion. This evidence suggests that target shareholders demand 
higher bid premiums as compensation for a possible expropriation risk following the merger and, 
to the extent that the premiums are not worth the risk, they may reject the bids, leading to lower 
probability of deal completion. Furthermore, we find a negative relation between cash payment 
and bid premiums, which implies that acquiring firms can mitigate the adverse effect of corruption 
by paying cash for their acquisition deals. 
Finally, we investigate the relations between corruption and acquirer and target shareholder 
values. Using the three-day M&A deal announcement cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR) 
as a proxy for shareholder value, we find that corruption is negatively related to acquirer 
shareholder value but cash payment can mitigate such negative value effect. Moreover, corruption 
in the target areas reduces target shareholder value, which implies a corruption discount, probably 
due to the acquirers’ concern about the threat of expropriation by local officials in the target areas. 
In summary, our results demonstrate a positive relation between corruption and cash payment 
conditional on excess cash, a negative relation between cash payment and bid premiums, and a 
positive relation between corruption and acquirer shareholder value conditional on cash payment. 
The evidence suggests M&As as an effective channel through which acquiring firms can shield 
their liquid assets from expropriation by local officials.  
Our research makes three important contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study that examines the relation between political corruption and 
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M&As, an important form of corporate investments. Whereas previous research documents that 
corruption impedes corporate investments, particularly capital expenditures (Campos et al. (1999), 
Malesky and Samphantharak (2008)), our research indicates that corruption motivates M&As. An 
advantage of using M&As for empirical research is that they are observable at precisely the points 
in time when the decisions are made, which allows us to establish a direct link between political 
corruption and M&As. Although increasing corporate payouts can help firms shield their liquid 
assets from political expropriation (Smith (2016)), it may undermine firms’ growth in the long 
term. As M&As enable firms to convert cash into hard-to-extract assets and relocate assets from 
the more corrupt to the less corrupt areas, acquiring firms not only shield their liquid assets but 
also maintain their growth trajectory. Thus, our evidence suggests M&As as a plausible channel 
through which firms can shield their liquid assets from local officials’ expropriation.  
Second, we add to the M&A literature by suggesting local corruption as a determinant of 
firm acquisitiveness and targetiveness. To the extent that M&As represent the market discipline 
that helps reallocate assets to a better use (Andrade and Stafford (2004), Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008), and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2008)), the negative effect of local corruption 
on firm targetiveness indicates that corruption impedes market discipline and hampers efficient 
asset reallocation.  
Finally, our research has important implications for policy makers, corporate managers, 
and investors. Our evidence indicates that local corruption discourages businesses from investing 
in their local areas while encouraging them to relocate their assets to less corrupt areas. Corruption, 
thus, distorts corporate investments and raises business costs, which adversely affect investors’ 
benefits and local economies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present a description of the data 
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and variables construction in Section II. Section III develops empirical predictions and discusses 
the research methods and results. Section IV presents robustness checks and Section V concludes 
the paper.  
II. Samples, Variables Construction, and Descriptive Statistics 
We obtain firm accounting data from Compustat, stock price and return data from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases, and M&A data from the Securities Data 
Company’s (SDC) Platinum Database. We merge the M&A and Compustat data to form the full 
sample to investigate the effect of political corruption on firm acquisitiveness and targetiveness. 
Following the literature, we exclude firms from the utility (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes from 4900-4999) and financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) since these industries are 
subject to more stringent regulations.3 We retain firm-year observations with at least one M&A 
deal to form the M&A subsample for cross-sectional analysis. Moreover, to focus on M&A deals 
that can have significant effects on the acquiring firms, we exclude small M&A deals with values 
below one million U.S. dollars from the M&A subsample. The sample period spans from 1986 to 
2014. 
Similar to Butler et al. (2009) and Smith (2016), we use the number of yearly corruption 
convictions of each of the 94 U.S. federal judicial districts obtained from the Report to Congress 
on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section as a measure of political corruption. 
This number of corruption convictions is scaled by the annual population estimate from the U.S. 
Census for each judicial district to ensure that a high corruption level is not merely due to a large 
                                                            
3 However, more regulations may induce more political corruption. Thus, we include these industries in the analysis 
and discuss the results in the robustness check section. 
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population of the district. By construction, a higher level of corruption per capita of a judicial 
district indicates a more corrupt environment in that district. We manually identify the ZIP codes 
associated with each federal judicial district and merge the corruption data with the full sample 
and the M&A subsample using the historical ZIP codes of firm headquarters locations.4  
Table 1 presents the number of M&A deals over the sample period, distributed by year in 
Panel A and by industry using the 2-digit SIC code in Panel B. The annual number of M&As deals 
increased over the period 1986-2000, peaking in 1998 before decreasing during the recession in 
2001-2002 and in 2009. Industries that experience high frequency of M&As include business 
services, electronic and other electrical equipment, chemicals and allied products, instruments and 
related products, industrial and commercial machinery, and computer equipment. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 We report the summary statistics of the full sample and the M&A subsample in Panels A 
and B, respectively, of Table 2. The full sample includes 77,338 firm-year observations of 8,314 
unique firms while the M&A subsample consists of 7,325 firm-year observations of 2,906 unique 
firms. District corruption is the yearly number of convictions per 100,000 of the judicial district 
in which a firm is headquartered. ACOR is the corruption per 100,000 of the judicial district in 
which an acquirer is headquartered. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the book 
value of assets. Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. 
Book leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets. Past 12-
month returns is the acquirer 12-month buy-and-hold stock return in the year prior to the M&A 
announcement. Average sales growth is the average annual sales growth rate over the last three 
                                                            
4 Since the Compustat database reports only the most recent ZIP codes of firm headquarters, we use a web crawler 
program to collect the ZIP codes of firm headquarters over the time from their 10-K reports. 
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years. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. The average corruption per 100,000 of the full 
sample and M&A subsample are 0.335 and 0.333, respectively, which are close to the figure 
(0.327) reported  by Smith (2016). The average firm size, market-to-book ratio, past 12-month 
returns, and firm age of the M&A subsample appear to be larger than those of the full sample. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
III. Empirical Predictions, Research Methods, Results, and Discussions 
A. Political Corruptions, Firm Acquisitiveness, and Firm Targetiveness 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that expropriation by public officials presents a real threat to 
firms. For instance, former Arkansas state senator, Jeremy Hutchinson, pleaded guilty to multiple 
bribes in connection with several investigations, spanning the Western District of Missouri and 
Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas. Hutchinson admitted that he was hired as outside 
counsel to perform official acts on behalf of Preferred Family Healthcare, Inc., including holding 
up agency budgets and drafting and voting on legislation in exchange for payments. In a separate 
scheme, Hutchinson also pleaded guilty on June 25, 2019 to bribery in which the former Arkansas 
state senator took official action in exchange for bribes from an owner of orthodontic clinics 
throughout the state of Arkansas.5  
Early theoretical work by Myers and Rajan (1998) suggests that firms are more likely to 
channel its liquid assets to hard-to-extract investments to reduce rent-seeking that arises from 
corruption. Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) examine the impact of corruption, among other 
institutional differences, on the capital structure and debt maturity choices of firms from 39 
                                                            
5 Source: Press Release from the U.S. Department of Justice, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-
wdmo/pr/former-arkansas-state-senator-pleads-guilty-bribery (last accessed on September 9, 2019) 
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developed and developing countries. These authors find that firms located in more corrupt 
countries use more debt financing with shorter maturity to shelter their assets from political 
expropriation. Similarly, Caprio et al. (2013) report that firms respond to political corruption and 
threats of rent extraction by holding significantly lower liquid assets while channeling their cash 
to harder to extract assets, including property, plant, equipment, and inventory, and paying more 
dividends. However, it is worth noting that investing in fixed assets alone might not fully insulate 
firms from expropriation risk since firms will have less flexibility and become more vulnerable to 
future extortion by local officials. Smith (2016) examines the impact of U.S. corruption on firm 
behavior and finds that firms manage their cash level downward while managing their debt ratio 
upward to shelter their liquid assets from political expropriation. These arguments suggest that 
political corruption increases not only direct costs due to politicians’ rent-seeking but also indirect 
costs associated with asset reallocation that deviates from an otherwise optimal structure  
Bai et al. (2014) develops a model in which local officials set a bribe rate and firms either 
pay the bribe or move elsewhere. Although M&As involve significant costs, to the extent that the 
benefits of engaging in M&As to shelter firm liquid assets from local officials’ expropriation 
outweigh their costs, we predict that firms located in more corrupt areas are more likely to pursue 
acquisitions to convert their liquid assets into hard ones, which are more difficult to extract. In 
addition, acquisitions also allow acquiring firms to relocate liquid assets to less corrupt areas, 
further shielding their assets from potential expropriation by local officials. Conversely, firms in 
highly corrupt areas will be less likely to become acquisition targets due to a greater threat of 
political extraction. 
We examine the effect of political corruption on firm acquisitiveness using the following 
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linear probability model:6 
M&A dummyi,t = α + β*District corruptioni,t-1 + λ*Ci,t-1 + δYear dummies + γIndustry dummies + 
εi,t,                 (1) 
where M&A dummy is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if firm i makes at least one 
acquisition announcement in year t, and 0 otherwise. District corruption measures the level of 
political corruption of the judicial district in which firm i’s headquarters is located in a given year.7 
Following the M&A literature, we control for several firm characteristics documented to have 
power in explaining firm acquisitiveness including size, market-to-book ratio, book leverage, past 
12-month returns, firm age, non-cash working capital, and average sales growth. The control 
variables are lagged by one period to alleviate possible endogeneity concern. We additionally 
control for industry and year fixed effects in our M&A linear probability model. We cluster the 
standard errors by firms.8 The definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix A.  
Columns 1-2 of Table 3 reports the M&A linear probability model results. The coefficients 
of District corruption are positive (0.009 and 0.012) and highly significant. These results indicate 
that firms headquartered in more corrupt areas are more likely to pursue M&As.9 Since both the 
corruption level and M&A activities could be correlated with the economic conditions of the firms’ 
headquarters states, we further control for the natural logarithm of the state GDP per capita and 
                                                            
6 We use the linear probability model to alleviate concern about the incidental parameter problem since the model 
controls for several dummy variables. However, our findings are qualitatively unchanged if we use the probit model. 
7 Our results are qualitatively similar if we use the contemporaneous level of political corruption in the regressions. 
8 For robustness, we also cluster the standard errors by judicial districts and years but find qualitatively similar results.  
9 In an unreported univariate analysis, we find that acquirers, on average, choose targets located in relatively less 
corrupt areas. 
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state GDP growth rate in the M&A linear probability model and report the results in Column 3 of 
Table 3. We find that the coefficient of District corruption remains positive (0.018) and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. To illustrate the economic effect of corruption, we use the 
coefficient estimate in Column 3 for calculation and find that, holding other variables unchanged 
at their sample means, a 1-standard-deviation increase in District corruption above its sample 
mean is associated with 75 basis points (0.75%) increase in acquisition probability, which is 
equivalent to 3% of the sample mean. Since political corruption can be correlated with other 
unobserved time-invariant factors, we control for either state, judicial district, or firm fixed effects 
in alternative model specifications but our results are qualitatively unchanged (to save space, the 
estimation results are not reported but are available from the authors). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We investigate the effects of political corruption on firm targetiveness by estimating the 
following linear probability model: 
Target dummyi,t = α + β*District corruptioni,t-1 + λ*Ci,t-1 + δYear dummies + γIndustry dummies 
+ εi,t,                           (2) 
where Target dummy takes a value of 1 if a firm is an acquisition target in a given year, and 0 
otherwise. Ci,t-1 is a set of control variables similar to that in Equation 1. The estimation results of 
the targetiveness linear probability models reported in Columns 4-6 of Table 3, indicate that the 
coefficient estimates of District corruption are negative (-0.008 and -0.01) and highly significant, 
suggesting that firms located in more corrupt areas are less likely to be acquisition targets.  
In summary, our evidence in this section is consistent with the argument that the threat of 
expropriation by local officials leads to an increase (decrease) in firm acquisitiveness 
(targetiveness). 
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B. Corruption and Payment Consideration 
In response to the rent-seeking behavior of local officials, firms tend to hold lower cash 
reserves and maintain higher debt ratios (Caprio et al. (2011), Smith (2016)). This finding suggests 
that acquirers in highly corrupt areas are more (less) likely to use stock (cash) as a medium of 
payment for acquisition deals. However, if these firms have excess cash, they will be more likely 
to use cash for acquisition payment to reduce their exposure to expropriation risk.  
We use the following linear probability model to examine the relation between political 
corruption and payment consideration:  
Cash dummyij = α + β*ACORi,t-1 + ϒ*TCORi,t-1 + λ*Ci,t-1 + δYear dummies + γIndustry dummies 
+ εi,t,                               (3) 
where cash dummy is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the payment for M&A deal j 
of firm i is fully in stock, and 0 otherwise. ACOR (TCOR) is the level of corruption in the acquirer 
(target) judicial district. Following previous studies (e.g., Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh 
(2006), Faccio and Masulis (2005), and Phan (2014)), we control for firm and deal characteristics 
such as size, market-to-book, past 12-month returns, average sales growth, book leverage, noncash 
working capital, firm age, excess cash, deal ratio, diversifying dummy, hostile dummy, public 
dummy, and challenge dummy. Appendix A provides the description of the variables.  
The results of the payment consideration regression reported in Table 4 indicate that, on 
average, the level of corruption in an acquirer area is negatively related to the likelihood of cash 
payment. We further estimate the payment consideration model augmented with an interaction 
between ACOR and corporate excess cash. We follow Harford (1999) in calculating excess cash 
as the residuals from the regression of a firm’s level of cash holdings on firm size, financial 
leverage, market-to-book ratio, cash flows, standard deviation of cash flows over the last 10 years, 
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net working capital, capital expenditures, research and development expenses, acquisition 
spending, dividend expense, S&P credit ratings, and industry and year fixed effects. The results 
reported in Columns 5-8 of Table 4 indicate that the coefficients of the interaction between ACOR 
and excess cash are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all models, suggesting 
that acquiring firms with larger excess cash and located in more corrupt areas are more (less) likely 
to use cash (stock) as the medium of payment for M&A deals. These results are consistent with 
our predictions. On the other hand, the effect of the target judicial district’s corruption level on the 
payment consideration is inconclusive.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
C. Political Corruption, Bid Premiums, and Likelihood of Deal Completion 
To the extent that political corruption increases operating costs and impedes business 
operations, we predict a positive (negative) relation between acquirer district corruption and the 
bid premium (deal completion likelihood). Moreover, we expect these relations to be more 
pronounced when the level of corruption in the acquirer judicial district is higher than that in the 
target one.  
We examine the relation between political corruption and bid premiums by estimating the 
following regression model: 
Bid premiumij = α + β*ACORi,t-1 + ϒ*TCORi,t-1 + λ*Ci,t-1 + δYear dummies + γIndustry dummies 
+ εi,t,                        (4) 
where Bid premium is measured as the percentage difference between the bid price and the target’s 
stock price one week before the deal announcement. C is a vector of control variables that include 
firm and deal characteristics similar to those in Equation 3 (Officer (2003), Dimopoulos and 
Sacchetto (2014)). Table 5 reports the results of the bid premium regressions. The regression 
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sample for this analysis is small since the bid premiums can be calculated for only public targets. 
The coefficients of ACOR are positive, ranging from 0.035 to 0.056, and statistically significant in 
all models. However, cash payment is negatively related to the bid premiums. These results suggest 
that acquiring firms located in highly corrupt areas have to pay higher bid premiums but using 
cash for acquisition payment decreases the bid premiums. On the other hand, the coefficients of 
TCOR are statistically insignificant.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Next, we investigate the relation between political corruptions and the likelihood of deal 
completion. The dependent variable is completion dummy that takes a value of 1 for a deal 
completion, and 0 for a deal abandonment. The deal completion linear probability model includes 
either both ACOR and TCOR or the difference between these two variables (labeled Delta 
corruption). The results of the linear probability regression reported in Columns 1-4 of Table 6, 
which include both ACOR and TCOR, are consistent with the view that corruption impedes 
business operations. In particular, the coefficient estimates of ACOR are negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that acquisition deals of acquirers headquartered in more corrupt areas have 
lower likelihood of completion. Similarly, the negative and highly significant coefficients of Delta 
corruption reported in Columns 5-8 of Table 6 suggest that acquirers located in relatively more 
corrupt areas have lower likelihood of completing the acquisition deals with targets located in less 
corrupt areas. One possible explanation is that target shareholders reject the bids of acquirers from 
highly corrupt areas due to their concerns about the expropriation risk in the latter’ areas. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
C. Political Corruption and Shareholder Value 
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In this section, we examine the effects of corruption on acquirer and target shareholder 
values. The level of corruption in an acquirer district should be negatively related to its shareholder 
value due to the direct and indirect costs associated with corruption discussed above. However, 
acquirers from highly corrupt areas may create shareholder value through acquisitions if they help 
shelter the acquiring firms’ liquid assets from expropriation by local officials. Therefore, we expect 
a positive effect of the interaction between corruption and cash payment on acquirer shareholder 
value or, put in a different way, cash payment will mitigate the adverse effect of corruption on 
acquirer shareholder value. Furthermore, following the shielding argument, we predict a negative 
relation between the corruption level in the target district and acquirer shareholder value.  
Columns 1-4 of Table 7 reports the results of the cross-sectional regressions of acquirer 
three-day abnormal stock returns (CAR(-1, 1)) on ACOR, ACOR*cash dummy, ACOR*stock 
dummy, and other firm and deal characteristics.10 We use the market model and value-weighted 
CRSP index returns to estimate acquirer three-day CARs. Following a long line of M&A research 
(e.g., Harford (1999), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005), and Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
(2007)), we control for the following firm and deal characteristics in the CAR regressions: size, 
market-to-book ratio, financial leverage, past 12-month returns, high-tech dummy, cash dummy, 
stock dummy, deal attitude dummy, target public status, challenge dummy, and industry M&A 
intensity. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
Firms may self-select to pursue M&As and, all else being equal, they are more likely to 
pursue deals that create greater shareholder value. This observation indicates that our cross-
sectional regression is subject to a possible self-selection problem that biases the coefficient 
                                                            
10 Mixed payment consideration is left out to avoid perfect collinearity. 
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estimates. We address the self-selection bias problem by using the Heckman’s (1976, 1979) two-
step self-selection correction model. Specifically, we use the estimates from the M&A probit 
model to calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR), then we include the IMR in the cross-sectional 
regressions as an additional control variable (however, our results are insensitive to the correction 
for self-selection bias).   
The acquirer CAR regression results reported in Columns 1-4 of Table 7 indicate that the 
coefficients of the stand-alone ACOR are negative and statistically significant while the 
coefficients of the interaction between ACOR and cash dummy are positive and statistically 
significant. This result indicates that firms’ sheltering of their liquid assets from potential 
expropriation by using cash for acquisition payment is viewed favorably by their shareholders. 
Using the coefficient estimates to calculate the economic effect of corruption on acquirer 
shareholder value, we find that, holding other variables fixed at their sample means, a 1-standard-
deviation increase in ACOR above its sample mean is associated with 35 basis points (i.e., 0.35%) 
or $17.2 million decrease in acquirer shareholder value. However, the result of a Wald test 
indicates that the sum of the coefficient of ACOR and that of its interaction with cash payment is 
statistically indifferent from zero, implying that cash payment neutralizes the negative effect of 
corruption on acquirer shareholder value. On the other hand, the coefficients of TCOR are 
statistically insignificant, indicating little effect of the corruption level of the target’s judicial 
district on acquirer shareholder value.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
We examine the effects of political corruption on target CARs and report the results in 
Columns 5-8 of Table 7. The coefficients of ACOR are positive and statistically significant at the 
1% and 5% levels in all specifications. This result is consistent with our earlier finding that 
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acquirers located in more corrupt areas tend to pay higher bid premiums, which appear to benefit 
target shareholders. In contrast, the coefficients of TCOR are negative and statistically significant 
in Columns 1 and 2, indicating that target firms located in more corrupt areas suffer from a larger 
corruption discount that decreases target shareholder value. The estimation results indicate that, 
holding other variables unchanged at their sample means, a 1-standard-deviation increase in TCOR 
above its sample mean is associated with a decrease of 48 basis points (i.e., 0.48%) or a loss of 
$16.1 million in target shareholder value. 
In summary, our evidence in this section indicates that corruption in the acquirer and target 
districts is negatively related to their respective shareholder value. However, cash payment 
attenuates the negative effect of corruption on acquirer shareholder value. 
IV. Robustness Checks and Other Analyses 
A. Political Connections and Political Balance 
Both political corruption and M&A activities could be correlated with firms’ political 
connections so failing to control for political connections may bias the results. Moreover, political 
corruption and M&As decisions can also be correlated with the political balance in a state. In 
particular, states with Republican dominance tend to favor businesses, whereas states with 
Democrat dominance tend to favor labor. To alleviate these concerns, we rerun firm 
acquisitiveness and targetiveness regressions that further control for political connections and state 
political balance. Following Faccio and Hsu (2017), we first obtain the background information 
such as employment positions, education, political positions and affiliations for all firm executives 
from the Capital IQ database. We identify politically connected individuals by matching each 
executive position and affiliation with 42 political keywords provided by Faccio and Hsu such as 
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“Governor of the State”, “Senator”, “Congress”, and “White House”, etc. We consider a firm as 
politically connected if they employ at least one politically connected executive anytime during 
the sample period. We construct the political connection variable as an indicator that equals 1 for 
politically connected firms and 0 otherwise. State political balance is proxied by the state-level 
fraction of the Democratic Party members in the House of Representatives in a given year (Serfling 
(2016); Bai, Fairhurst, and Serfling (2017)).  
The results reported in Panel A of Table A1 in the Internet Appendix indicate that our 
findings are qualitatively unchanged. Furthermore, we find a negative relation between political 
connections and firm acquisitiveness, implying that politically connected firms are less likely to 
engage in M&As deals. One possible explanation for this result is that acquiring firms typically 
pursue out-of-state targets, whereas politically connected firms may prefer to stay local to take 
advantage of their connections with local officials. In another robustness check, we rerun the 
acquirer CAR regressions while additionally controlling for political connections and political 
balance. The reported results in Panel B of Table A1 in the Internet Appendix indicate that our 
findings are qualitatively similar. 
B. Product Market Competition 
Political corruption and M&As decisions can also be correlated with product market 
competition. Specifically, Hoberg and Phillips (2010) argue that firms in competitive industries 
can use restructuring, possibly through M&As, to reduce competition. Alexeev and Song (2013) 
document that product market competition is positively associated with corruption while Ades and 
Di Tella (1999) and Emerson (2006) find a negative relation between the degree of product market 
competition and the level of corruption. In the next robustness check, we rerun firm acquisitiveness 
regressions that control for industry competition proxied by the text-based Herfindahl-Hirschman 
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Index (HHI). Using over 50,000 business descriptions in 10-K annual filings on the SEC from 
1996-2017, Hoberg and Phillips (2016) develop a new industry classification (referred to as the 
Text-based Network Industry Classification (TNIC)) and construct the text-based Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) based on the this industry classification. Since the HHI data is available 
from 1996, our M&A subsample consists of 48,411 firm-year observations. Results of the firm 
acquisitiveness regressions reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A of Table A2 in the Internet 
Appendix indicate that the coefficients of District corruption remain positive (ranging from 0.013 
to 0.020) and statistically significant at the 1% level in all models. We also rerun firm targetiveness 
regressions augmented with text-based product market competition and report the results in 
Columns 3 and 4 of Panel A of Table A2 in the Internet Appendix. The results indicate that our 
finding is essentially unchanged. We rerun acquirer CARs regressions while additionally 
controlling product market competition and report the results in Panel B of Table A2 in the Internet 
Appendix. Our findings are qualitatively similar. 
C. IV Regressions 
Although our regressions control for state economic conditions, political connections, 
political balance, and product market competition, political corruption and M&As could be jointly 
correlated with other unobservable variables, raising an endogeneity concern due to possible 
omitted variables. Endogeneity could bias the coefficient estimates of the M&As linear probability 
models and invalidate the statistical inferences. We use the instrumental variable (IV) approach to 
address endogeneity concern. Brunetti and Weder (2003) and Gentzkow et al. (2006) argue that 
media and press coverage can constrain corruption. Campante and Do (2014) suggest that 
politicians are more corrupt in isolated capital cities due to lower media coverage of politics and 
less oversight from voters. Following these arguments, we use the isolation of state capital city 
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measured by the Gravity-based Centered Index for Spatial Concentration (GCISC) developed by 
Campante and Do as an instrument for state corruption (Smith (2016)).11 This variable measures 
the concentration of a state’s population and its distance to a state’s capital city. As such, a measure 
of 0 indicates a state’s population concentrates around its capital while a measure of 1 suggests 
that a majority of the state’s residents live as far away from the capital city as possible.  
We use the state-level shocks to newspaper reporter employment as the second instrument 
for political corruption. Intuitively, a larger decrease in the journalist employment may result in 
lower media and press coverage, leading to more political corruption. Using the news journalist 
employment data from Bureau of Labor Statistics, we construct the journalist employment shock 
variable as an indicator that equals 1 if the state news journalist employment decreases by more 
than 40% in a given year, and 0 otherwise.12 Our selected instruments should be valid since they 
relate directly to state corruption but there is no obvious reason that they have direct ties to M&A 
activities except through political corruption. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
We report the results of M&A IV linear probability model in Table 8. The first-stage results 
of the IV model reported in Column 1 indicate that the coefficients of the isolated capital city and 
journalist employment shock are positive (0.589 and 0.246, respectively) and significant at the 1% 
level, confirming the relevance of the instruments. The over-identification and weak identification 
test statistics indicate that the selected instruments are valid and strong. The results of the second-
                                                            
11 We thank Campante and Do for making the isolation of capital city data available. 
12 The results are qualitatively similar if we use the continuous version of the journalist employment change as an 
instrument. 
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stage of the IV model reported in Column 2 indicate that the coefficient of instrumented district 
corruption is positive (0.194) and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that our 
findings are robust to endogeneity correction.  
We estimate the targetiveness IV linear probability model and report the results in Columns 
3-4 of Table 8. The first-stage results and identification test statistics reported in Column 3 confirm 
the relevance and validity of the selected instruments. The results of the second-stage IV model 
reported in Column 4 indicate that the coefficient of instrumented district corruption is negative 
(-0.043) and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the results of the targetiveness 
linear probability model are insensitive to endogeneity correction.  
D. Alternative Measures of Corruption 
Using the number of corruption convictions in a judicial district to measure local corruption 
is prone to a possible criticism that the most corrupt districts may have the lowest number of 
convictions (Smith (2016)). Moreover, the data reflects federal corruption convictions but do not 
include cases tried by state and local prosecutors (Dincer and Johnston (2014)). Boylan and Long 
(2003) point out that there is usually a time lag between crimes and conviction. These observations 
suggest that our political corruption measure may underestimate the true nature of political 
corruption in the judicial district. To dispel this concern, we employ two other alternative measures 
of political corruption for robustness check. The first measure is the outcome of the 2012 State 
Integrity Investigation conducted by the Center of Public Integrity to grade each state’s 
transparency, accountability, and the law systems to deter corruption. A score of 100 indicates a 
state without corruption while a score of 0 means the state has the highest level of corruption. To 
ease interpretation, we invert the state integrity scores: A higher (lower) score indicates a higher 
(lower) level of corruption. The second measure is the corruption score based on the results of a 
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survey of State House reporters conducted by Boylan and Long. Specifically, State House reporters 
were asked to rank their states’ corruption on a scale from 1 to 7. A state’s score of 1 (7) is 
perceived as not corrupt (highly corrupt). Boylan and Long construct the state corruption score as 
the average of the responses for each state.  
We rerun firm acquisitiveness linear probability regressions using either the inverted 2012 
State Integrity Investigation score or the corruption score provided by Boylan and Long as proxies 
for political corruption in a firm’s location and report the results in Columns 1-4 of Table 9. Since 
the State Integrity Investigation was conducted in 2012, we use the subsample period 2010–2014 
for analysis. We find that the coefficients of the corruption measure based on the State Integrity 
Investigation are positive and statistically significant in all four columns.  
Column 5 of Table 9 report results of the regression that use the corruption scores based 
on the survey of State House reporters. Since Boylan and Long (2003) conduct the survey in 1999, 
we estimate the firm acquisitiveness linear probability model for the 5-year period centered on 
1999. The results indicate that the coefficients of the corruption measure are positive and highly 
significant, suggesting that our firm acquisitiveness results are robust to alternative measures of 
political corruption.13 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
E. Adoption of Anti-Corruption Laws as Exogenous Shock to Corruption 
                                                            
13 In an unreported analysis, we rerun the acquirer CAR regressions with these two alternative corruption measures 
and find consistent, albeit weaker, results. 
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To further address endogeneity concern associated with possible corruption 
mismeasurement, we exploit the state adoption of anti-corruption laws as a plausibly exogenous 
shock to identify the causal relations between political corruption and firm acquisitiveness and 
targetiveness. In particular, Texas adopted anti-corruption law (HB1690) in September 2015 and 
Florida adopted anti-corruption Act in October 2016. These two anti-corruption laws expand the 
applicability of offenses to any “state officers” and “state employees” and create new procedures 
for investigating and prosecuting corrupted officers, which potentially reduces the level of political 
corruption. We rerun firm acquisitiveness regressions on the anti-corruption law adoption and 
other control variables and report the results in Table A3 in the Internet Appendix. Anti-corruption 
law is an indicator that takes a value of 1 for firms located in states that adopted anti-corruption 
laws in a given year, and 0 otherwise. To the extent that anti-corruption laws reduce political 
corruption, we expect firms headquartered in these states to be less likely to engage in M&A 
activities as a way to shield their liquid assets. It is worth noting that firms affected by anti-
corruption laws could be systematically different from those not affected by these laws. Thus, the 
analysis results might reflect their systematic differences rather than the effects of the anti-
corruption measures. To alleviate this concern, we estimate the firm acquisitiveness model with a 
firms headquartered in Texas and Florida as treatment firms and those in their bordering states as 
control firms. Since these anti-corruption laws were adopted recently, we extend the regression 
sample to 2018. 
The results reported in Columns 1-2 of Table A3 in the Internet Appendix indicate that the 
coefficients of Anti-corruption law are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that firms 
are less likely to engage in acquisitions following the state anti-corruption law adoption. To 
mitigate a concern that the results could be driven by time trends of M&A and the adoption of anti-
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corruption laws, we estimate dynamic models that include indicators for years t-2, t-1, t, t+1 and 
after, where t is the year in which a state adopted the anti-corruption law. The results reported in 
Columns 3-4 of Table A3 indicate that the effect is only statistically significant in the year the law 
was adopted and after. We re-estimate the firm targetiveness regressions on the anti-corruption 
law adoption and report the results in Columns 5-8 of Table A3. We find that the coefficients of 
anti-corruption law are positive and highly significant in all models, indicating that firms are more 
likely to become acquisition targets after their headquarters state adopt the anti-corruption laws. 
We also examine the effect of anti-corruption laws on acquirer CARs but the results are 
inconclusive, possibly due to a small number of observations of acquisitions for firms 
headquartered in these states following the anti-corruption law adoption. 
F. Business Operation Concentration 
In our analysis, we assume that most firms’ business operation is concentrated in their 
headquarters locations. However, it is possible that firms’ major operation could be located in 
areas other than their headquarters locations. As such, the level of corruption in a firm’s 
headquarters location is unlikely to affect its business operation in a significant way. To explore 
this possibility, we follow Garcia and Norli (2012) in estimating the degree of a firm’s operation 
concentration in its headquarters state as the number of times the firm’s headquarters state was 
mentioned in the form 10-K each year during the period 1993-2008.14 We then re-examine the 
firm acquisitiveness linear probability model augmented with the degree of geographical 
concentration of a given firm’s operation and its interaction with the political corruption measure. 
The results of firm acquisitiveness model reported in Table 10 indicate that the coefficients of the 
                                                            
14 We thank Drs. Garcia and Norli for generously sharing data on firms’ geographical concentration of operation. 
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interaction between ACOR and the degree of operation concentration in the firm headquarters state 
are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that, conditional on the degree of operation 
concentration, firms headquartered in more corrupt areas are more likely to pursue M&As. This 
evidence is consistent with our earlier findings. On the other hand, the coefficient of the stand-
alone ACOR is statistically insignificant, implying that firms headquartered in highly corrupt areas 
do not necessarily pursue M&As to shield their liquid assets if their business operation is dispersed 
to other areas.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
G. Additional Analyses 
Since the SDC database focuses on M&A deals but may omit firms’ asset purchases, we 
further examine the relation between total assets acquisitions and political corruption using the 
ratio of a firm’s acquisition costs reported in the balance sheet (variable “aqc” in Compustat) to 
its book value of assets. The results reported in Table A4 in the Internet Appendix confirm our 
finding of a positive relation between political corruption and acquisitions.  
Both political corruption and M&A activities could be correlated with the crime rates of 
the firms’ headquartered states and failing to control for the crime rates may bias our findings. 
Thus, we rerun firm acquisitiveness and targetiveness regressions that further control for the state-
level crime rates.15 The results reported in Panel A of Table A5 in the Internet Appendix indicate 
that our findings are qualitatively unchanged. In another robustness check, we rerun the acquirer 
CAR regressions while additionally controlling the crime rates of firm headquarters states. The 
                                                            
15 State-level crime rates are retrieved from the U.S. Department of Justice via the Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, 
available at https://www.ucrdatatool.gov/. Last accessed on May 15, 2019. 
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reported results in Panel B of Table A5 in the Internet Appendix indicate that our findings are 
qualitatively similar. 
In our analyses, we follow the literature to exclude firms from the utility and financial 
industries since these industries are subject to more stringent regulations. However, it is possible 
that stringent regulations breed even more corruption. Thus, we rerun firm acquisitiveness and 
targetiveness regressions with a larger sample that does not exclude firms from the utility and 
financial industries. The results reported in Panel A of Table A6 in the Internet Appendix indicate 
that our findings are qualitatively similar. We further rerun acquirer CAR regressions and the 
results reported in Panel B of Table A6 in the Internet Appendix indicate that our findings are 
robust. 
Firms may engage in acquisitions to simply redeploy assets to other areas that offer better 
investment opportunities rather than shield their assets from potential expropriation by local 
officials. To investigate this alternative explanation for our findings, we run a univariate test to 
compare the GDP growth rates, which proxies for investment opportunities, of the acquirer and 
target states. The results indicate that the difference in GDP growth between acquirer and target 
states is small (-0.012%) and statistically insignificant. We further examine the difference in 
Tobin’s Q, another proxy for investment opportunities, of the acquirer and target of each 
acquisition deal along the corruption dimension but the difference is statistically insignificant. This 
evidence indicates that political corruption can better explain the acquisition decisions of the 
acquirers. 
Another possible alternative explanation for the positive relation between political 
corruption and firm acquisitiveness is that acquiring firms located in highly corrupt areas 
strategically engage in acquisitions and relocate assets from the targets’ less corrupt areas to their 
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home states to benefit from the corrupt environment and loose oversight by the local officials. If 
this argument is valid, we should observe a positive relation between acquirer shareholder value 
and the difference between ACOR and TCOR (i.e., Delta corruption). However, the negative 
relation between Delta corruption and acquirer CAR reported in Table 6 does not support this 
argument.  
Finally, we investigate the effects of political corruption on M&As at the judicial district 
level. Specifically, we estimate the district-level OLS regressions with either the natural logarithm 
of the number of M&A deals or the natural logarithm of the aggregate deal value for each judicial 
district in a given year as the dependent variable and report the estimation results in Table A7 in 
the Internet Appendix. The control variables include the judicial district-level averages of the firm 
characteristics similar to those in Equation 1. We find that district corruption is negatively related 
to both the number and aggregate deal values, which further corroborates the negative relation 
between corruption and firm acquisitiveness.  
V. Conclusions 
Previous research argues that faced with political corruption, firms pursue corporate 
policies that shield their assets from local officials’ expropriation. Using different measures of 
political corruption for analysis, we find robust evidence that local corruption is positively related 
to firm acquisitiveness but negatively related to firm targetiveness. When pursuing acquisition 
deals, acquiring firms located in highly corrupt areas are more likely to use stock payment, possibly 
because these firms typically maintain low cash reserves and high debt ratios to avoid local 
officials’ expropriation. However, when these firms have excess cash, they are more likely to use 
cash for acquisition payment, which help them shield liquid assets from expropriation by 
converting liquid assets into hard-to-extract assets and relocate assets away from a corrupt 
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environment. We further find that target shareholders are concerned about the threat of 
expropriation associated with corruption in the acquiring firms’ areas, leading to their demand for 
higher bid premiums as compensation for bearing the expropriation risk or even rejection of the 
bids if additional compensation is not worth the risk.  
We examine the relations between corruption and acquirer and target shareholder value 
and find that the level of corruption in the acquirer area is negatively related to acquirer shareholder 
value; however, cash payment can mitigate the negative value effect of corruption, which suggests 
the benefits of using M&As as a way to shield acquirers’ liquid assets. On the other hand, target 
shareholders suffer from corruption discounts. Overall, our findings suggest M&As as a plausible 
channel through which firms can shield their liquid assets from local officials’ expropriation.
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Appendix A: Variables Definition 
 
Variable name  Construction  Data source  
ACOR The number of corruption convictions per 
100,000 of the judicial district where the 
acquirer is headquartered. 
 
Report to Congress 
on the Activities and 
Operations of the 
Public Integrity 
Section and Census 
data 
 
Acquisition cost The ratio of acquisition costs reported in the 
balance sheet to the book value of assets. 
 
Compustat 
Average sale growth The average annual sale growth over the last 
3 years. 
 
Compustat  
Book leverage The ratio of book value of short-term and 
long-term debts to the book value of assets.  
 
Compustat 
CAR Cumulative abnormal stock returns over the 
window (-1, +1) centered on the M&A 
announcement day. 
 
CRSP and SDC 
Platinum 
Cash dummy   An indicator equals 1 if an M&A deal is fully 
funded by cash, and 0 otherwise.  
 
SDC Platinum 
Challenge dummy  An indicator equals 1 if the acquirer’s offer is 
challenged by a competing offer, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
SDC Platinum  
 
Delta corruption The difference between the levels of 
corruption in the acquirer’s and target’s 
judicial districts 
 
Report to Congress 
on the Activities and 
Operations of the 
Public Integrity 
Section 
 
Deal ratio  The ratio of the M&A deal value to the 
acquirer’s market value of equity measured 
four weeks before the deal announcement.  
 
SDC Platinum 
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District corruption The number of corruption convictions per 
100,000 of the judicial district where the 
acquirer is headquartered. 
 
Report to Congress 
on the Activities and 
Operations of the 
Public Integrity 
Section 
 
Diversifying dummy  An indicator equals 1 if the acquirer and 
target belong to different 2-digit SIC code 
industries, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Compustat 
Excess Cash  The difference between the expected and 
realized cash holdings. 
 
Compustat 
Firm age  
 
Number of years that a firm appeared in 
Compustat. 
 
Compustat 
High tech dummy  
 
An indicator that takes a value of 1 if an 
acquirer’s 4-digit SIC code is equal to 3571, 
3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 3663, 3669, 
3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679, 
3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829, 3841, 
3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7371-7375, 7378, 
7379, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Compustat 
Hostile dummy An indicator that equals 1 if the M&A deal is 
a hostile takeover, and 0 otherwise. 
 
SDC Platinum 
IMR The inverse Mill’s ratio calculated using the 
M&A probit model estimates. 
 
Compustat and SDC 
Platinum 
Industry M&A intensity The ratio of target book value of assets to the 
aggregate book value of assets of all firms in 
the same 2-digit SIC code industry and year. 
 
Compustat and SDC 
Platinum 
 
M&A dummy  
 
An indicator equals 1 if a firm makes at least 
one M&A announcement in a given year, and 
0 otherwise. 
 
SDC Platinum 
 
Market-to-book ratio  
 
The ratio of the market value of assets to the 
book value of assets. 
 
Compustat 
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Noncash working capital 
ratio  
The ratio of (working capital – cash) to the 
book value of assets. 
 
Compustat 
Past 12-month returns  The buy-and-hold 12-month stock return of 
the year preceding an M&A announcement. 
 
CRSP  
Public dummy  
 
An indicator that equals 1 for a publicly listed 
target, and 0 otherwise. 
 
SDC Platinum 
 
Size The natural logarithm of the book value of 
assets. 
 
Compustat  
Stock dummy   An indicator that equals 1 if the payment is 
fully in stock, and 0 otherwise. 
 
SDC Platinum 
TCOR The number of corruption convictions per 
100,000 in the judicial district where the 
target is headquartered.  
 
Report to Congress 
on the Activities and 
Operations of the 
Public Integrity 
Section 
 
Tobin’s Q (Book value of assets – book value of equity 
+ market value of equity – deferred 
taxes)/book value of assets.  
Compustat 
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Table 1: Distribution of M&As by Year and Industry 
Table 1 reports the annual and 2-digit SIC code industry distribution of M&A subsample for the 
period 1986-2014. 
Panel A: M&A Subsample Distribution by Year 
Year   Frequency Percent 
1986  104 1.42% 
1987  271 3.70% 
1988  142 1.94% 
1989  209 2.85% 
1990  257 3.51% 
1991  138 1.88% 
1992  155 2.12% 
1993  181 2.47% 
1994  223 3.04% 
1995  245 3.34% 
1996  312 4.26% 
1997  339 4.63% 
1998  462 6.31% 
1999  366 5.00% 
2000  239 3.26% 
2001  209 2.85% 
2002  160 2.18% 
2003  190 2.59% 
2004  234 3.19% 
2005  278 3.80% 
2006  269 3.67% 
2007  362 4.94% 
2008  429 5.86% 
2009  204 2.78% 
2010  268 3.66% 
2011  342 4.67% 
2012  272 3.71% 
2013  253 3.45% 
2014   212 2.89% 
Total   7,325 100% 
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Panel B: M&A Distribution by Industries 
2-digit SIC  
Percent  Industry Description  Frequency Percent 
73 Business services 838 11.44% 
36 Electronic and other electrical equipment  753 10.28% 
28 Chemicals and allied products 618 8.44% 
38 Instruments and related products 614 8.38% 
35 Industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment 600 8.19% 
13 Oil and gas extraction 236 3.22% 
37 Transportation equipment 220 3.00% 
48 Communications 205 2.80% 
58 Eating & Drinking Places 204 2.78% 
20 Food and kindred products 200 2.73% 
50 Wholesale trade - durable goods 194 2.65% 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 170 2.32% 
  Industries with < 2% representation 2,473 33.76% 
  Total 7,325 100% 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the full sample and the M&A subsample in Panels A 
and B, respectively. District corruption is the yearly number of convictions per 100,000 of the 
judicial district in which a firm is headquartered. ACOR is the yearly number of convictions per 
100,000 of the judicial district in which an acquirer firm is headquartered. Market-to-book ratio is 
the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Book leverage is the ratio of the 
book value of short-term and long-term debts to book value of assets. Past 12-month returns is the 
acquirer 12-month buy-and-hold stock return in the year preceding an M&A announcement. 
Average sales growth is the average annual sales growth rate over a 3-year period. Noncash 
working capital is the working capital minus cash, scaled by the book value of assets. Firm age is 
the number of years a firm has been included in Compustat.  
Panel A: Full Sample   
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. Dev. 
District corruption 77,338 0.335 0.129 0.249 0.433 0.411 
Book assets (in million $) 77,338 5.338 3.755 5.241 6.793 2.111 
Market-to-book ratio 77,338 1.568 0.773 1.117 1.792 1.379 
Past 12-month returns 77,338 0.164 -0.229 0.059 0.382 0.656 
Average sale growth 77,338 0.196 0.014 0.098 0.225 0.444 
Book leverage 77,338 0.215 0.029 0.182 0.336 0.199 
Non-cash working capital 77,338 0.322 0.163 0.307 0.461 0.194 
Firm age 77,338 19.318 9.000 15.000 26.000 12.819 
   
Panel B: M&A Subsample   
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. Dev. 
ACOR 7,325 0.333 0.125 0.248 0.433 0.417 
Book assets (in million $) 7,325 6.323 4.911 6.247 7.624 1.890 
Market-to-book ratio 7,325 1.644 0.888 1.276 1.931 1.238 
Past 12-month returns 7,325 0.206 -0.109 0.122 0.392 0.544 
Average sale growth 7,325 0.163 0.031 0.100 0.205 0.305 
Book leverage 7,325 0.184 0.020 0.157 0.286 0.175 
Non-cash working capital 7,325 0.318 0.174 0.305 0.445 0.180 
Firm age 7,325 22.214 11.000 18.000 31.000 14.005 
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Table 3: Political Corruption and Firm Acquisitiveness and Targetiveness 
Table 3 reports the results of firm acquisitiveness and targetiveness linear probability models in 
Panels A and B, respectively. The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 is M&A dummy that takes a 
value of 1 if a firm makes at least one M&A announcement in a given year, and 0 otherwise. The 
dependent variable in Columns 4-6 is Target dummy that takes value of 1 if a firm is an acquisition 
target in a given year, and 0 otherwise. District corruption is the yearly number of convictions per 
100,000 of the judicial district in which the firm is headquartered. Other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are 
reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
  Firm Acquisitiveness   Firm Targetiveness 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
District corruption 0.009** 0.012*** 0.018*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (2.53) (3.25) (4.51) (2.74) (2.92) (2.66) 
State GDP per capita  -0.057***  -0.002 
  (4.97)  (0.22) 
State GDP growth rate  0.380***  0.013 
  (6.71)  (0.19) 
Size 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.064*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.030*** 
 (70.45) (68.34) (70.55) (33.87) (33.84) (36.85) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.004*** 
 (11.32) (11.55) (9.90) (1.13) (2.09) (3.11) 
Past 12-month returns 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.028*** -0.004* -0.004 -0.001 
 (10.78) (10.95) (11.29) (1.78) (1.55) (0.13) 
Average sale growth 0.001 0.007* 0.012 -0.007** -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.55) (1.95) (1.46) (2.22) (1.41) (1.47) 
Book leverage -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.182*** -0.087*** -0.082*** -0.093*** 
 (19.92) (19.77) (21.64) (12.28) (11.17) (12.26) 
Non-cash working capital 0.038*** 0.027*** 0.011 0.011 0.016* 0.01 
 (4.50) (2.95) (1.18) (1.48) (1.81) (1.12) 
Firm age -0.004* -0.005** -0.014*** -0.006*** -0.003 -0.011*** 
 (1.67) (1.99) (4.90) (2.77) (1.09) (4.19) 
Intercept -0.111*** -0.047*** 0.538 0.004 -0.106 -0.032 
 (3.05) (5.28) (1.32) (0.13) (0.69) (0.26) 
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Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 77,338  77,338  77,338  77,338  77,338  77,338  
Adjusted R2 0.09  0.08  0.09    0.03  0.04  0.04  
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Table 5: Political Corruption and Bid Premiums 
Table 5 reports the bid premiums OLS regressions. The dependent variable is Bid premiums, which 
is measured as the percentage difference between the bidding price and the target stock price one 
week prior to an M&A announcement. ACOR (TCOR) is the yearly number of convictions per 
100,000 of the judicial district in which the acquirer (target) is headquartered. Other variables are 
defined in Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by 
firms are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ACOR 0.046** 0.035* 0.056*** 0.041** 
 (1.97) (1.75) (3.28) (2.36) 
TCOR 0.159  0.158  0.144  0.144  
 (1.23) (1.14) (1.20) (1.11) 
Size 0.052  0.072** 0.038  0.052* 
 (1.63) (2.23) (1.28) (1.74) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.001  0.026  0.012  0.041  
 (0.01) (0.64) (0.34) (1.15) 
Past 12-month returns 0.088 0.017 0.071 -0.015 
 (1.22) (0.22) (1.04) (0.23) 
Average sale growth 0.040  0.061  0.045  0.081  
 (0.23) (0.36) (0.27) (0.50) 
Book leverage 0.237  0.464  0.042  0.250  
 (0.80) (1.58) (0.15) (0.86) 
Non-cash working capital 0.257 0.551 -0.215 0.029 
 (0.65) (1.38) (0.68) (0.09) 
Firm age -0.127 -0.230*** -0.105 -0.203** 
 (1.49) (2.71) (1.32) (2.52) 
Deal ratio 0.149*** 0.169*** 0.140*** 0.158*** 
 (2.79) (3.18) (2.81) (3.25) 
Stock dummy -0.012 0.007 0.038 0.061 
 (0.10) (0.06) (0.32) (0.50) 
Cash dummy -0.242* -0.412*** -0.268** -0.478*** 
 (1.95) (3.27) (2.36) (4.11) 
Diversifying dummy 0.387*** 0.503*** 0.333*** 0.455*** 
 (3.86) (4.96) (3.53) (4.86) 
Hostile dummy 0.335* 0.377** 0.443** 0.525*** 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3185775 
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 (1.86) (2.03) (2.58) (2.97) 
Target public dummy -0.524 -0.509 -0.369 -0.335 
 (1.30) (1.15) (1.11) (1.09) 
Challenge dummy 0.512*** 0.612*** 0.492*** 0.611*** 
 (4.72) (5.37) (4.84) (5.70) 
Intercept  -2.622*** -0.133 -1.180*** -1.313*** 
 (5.12) (0.23) (2.66) (3.03) 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No No 
Number of observations 944  944  944  944  
Adjusted R2 0.20  0.14  0.19  0.12  
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Table 8: Political Corruption and Firm Acquisitiveness and Targetiveness – IV Linear 
Probability Model 
Table 8 reports the results of the 2-stage firm acquisitiveness and targetiveness IV linear 
probability models in Columns 1-2 and 3-4, respectively. The dependent variable in the firm 
acquisitiveness model is M&A dummy that takes a value of 1 if a firm makes at least one M&A 
announcement in a given year, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the firm targetiveness 
model is Target dummy that takes value of 1 if a firm is acquired in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
Isolation state capital is the state population concentration around its capital city, adjusted for state 
size. Journalist employment shock is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the state news 
journalist employment decreases more than 40% in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Other variables 
are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Acquisitiveness IV Regression   Targetiveness IV Regression 
Variable 
First-stage Second-stage First-stage Second-stage 
(1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Instrumented district corruption  0.194*** -0.043** 
  (6.35) (2.03) 
Isolation state capital 0.589*** 0.800***  
 (31.81) (57.74)  
Journalist employment shock 0.246*** 0.263***  
 (11.12) (16.16)  
Size 0.004*** 0.059*** 0.002*** 0.030*** 
 (5.35) (66.23) (2.88) (38.44) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.002* 0.014*** -0.002* -0.003*** 
 (1.69) (10.94) (1.92) (3.34) 
Past 12-month returns 0.002 0.028*** 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.63) (11.37) (0.63) (1.44) 
Average sale growth 0.021*** 0.004 0.011*** -0.006* 
 (6.11) (1.04) (4.34) (1.92) 
Book leverage 0.022*** -0.149*** 0.031*** -0.089*** 
 (2.73) (17.49) (5.23) (12.32) 
Non-cash working capital 0.031*** 0.044*** 0.068*** 0.013  
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 (3.18) (4.26) (9.58) (1.49) 
Firm age 0.023*** -0.010*** 0.027*** -0.009*** 
 (8.71) (3.62) (14.02) (3.56) 
Intercept  -0.226*** -0.078*** -0.252*** -0.170*** 
 (13.83) (6.65) (3.48) (11.77) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 77,338  77,338  77,338  77,338  
   
Over-identification test   
Sargan χ2  0.081  0.343  
   
Weak identification test   
Cragg-Donald Wald F  599.18*** 1817.13*** 
     statistic   
Weak instrument robust inference   
Anderson-Rubin Wald test   41.61***     4.96* 
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Table 9: Alternative Measures of Political Corruption and Firm Acquisitiveness  
Table 9 reports the results of firm acquisitiveness linear probability models. The dependent 
variable is M&A dummy that takes a value of 1 if a firm makes at least one M&A announcement 
in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Alternative corruption measure is the corruption score based on 
the survey of State House reporters in Columns 1-4 or the inverted integrity investigation scores 
or corruption survey scores from Boylan and Long (2003) for each state in which the acquirer is 
headquartered in Column 5. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics based on 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
Corruption Measure Based on State Integrity 
Investigation   
Corruption Measure 
Based on Boylan and 
Long (2003) Survey 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) 
Alternative corruption measure 3.238* 2.755* 4.818* 4.313* 0.011** 
 (1.77) (1.74) (1.94) (1.84) (2.46) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,353 8,353 8,353 8,353 13,648 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.17   0.11 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3185775 
54 
 
Table 10: Political Corruption, Geographic Concentration of Firm Operation, and Firm 
Acquisitiveness  
Table 10 reports the results of the firm acquisitiveness linear probability model. The dependent 
variable is M&A dummy that takes a value of 1 if a firm makes at least one M&A announcement 
in a given year, and 0 otherwise. District corruption is the yearly number of convictions per 
100,000 of the judicial district in which the acquirer is headquartered. Geographic concentration 
is the degree of a firm’s operation concentrated in the headquarters state. Other variables are 
defined in Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by 
firms are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
District corruption -0.018 -0.019 -0.023 -0.022 
 (1.23) (1.33) (1.56) (1.54) 
District corruption *Geographic concentration 0.057** 0.052* 0.066** 0.065** 
 (2.06) (1.89) (2.42) (2.40) 
Geographic concentration -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.078*** -0.078*** 
 (5.20) (5.10) (5.56) (5.57) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 35,928 35,928 35,928 35,928 
Adjusted. R2 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 
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